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Abstract 
Requisite variety and intercultural teams: To what extent is Ashby’s law useful? 
 
The “Law of Requisite Variety” (LRV) is frequently evoked to explain the design, 
functioning and performance of intercultural teams. But to what extent does the law really 
enhance understanding in this particular field? The authors consider that LRV has rarely been 
questioned in-depth in management studies. The paper briefly details LRV in the cybernetics 
context before “translating” it to social systems, organizations and intercultural teams. Using 
a qualitative case-study method, the case of an intercultural team is analysed and questioned 
from the perspective of LRV. The results show that LRV superficially fits the composition of 
this team, but is unable to explain the human and social dynamics that evolve during the work 
process.  
Key words: law of requisite variety, requisite variety, intercultural teams, complexity, 
diversity, systems, case study 
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Introduction 
In the field of organization theory, the idea of ‘requisite variety’ is used as a key element in 
theoretical frameworks. Related to the business world in general, the cybernetic ‘law of 
requisite variety’ (LRV) (Ashby 1956) points out that the degree of a company’s relevant 
environmental complexity should be matched by a corresponding degree of internal 
complexity in order to survive in a competitive market (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). This 
idea of “fit” between an organization and its environment is one of the most enduring ideas in 
the field of organization theory (Drazin and Van de Ven 1985). The term “requisite variety” is 
also mentioned in management literature. For example, Lane et al., (2004: 19) point out that 
in the context of globalisation, “the appropriate response to complexity is through the 
deliberate development of requisite variety”. Yet, the LRV is rarely discussed in-depth. The 
theoretical framework that authors refer to is not always clear and its basic assumptions are 
not elicited.  
 
In the field of management, the LRV is often associated with team issues and diversity. 
“Teams are now seen as solutions to problems of external adaptation, responding to 
complexity by bringing together a variety of perspectives while responding to dynamic 
changes” (Schneider and Barsoux 2003: 217). Diversity (in terms of age, race, gender, 
education, professional background, personal experience, etc.) always exists in teams to a 
greater or lesser extent. Intercultural teams are a very striking example. They aim to match the 
diversity of the environment (see Weick and Van Orden 1990, Webber and Donahue 2001, 
Schneider and Barsoux 2003, Gluesing and Gibson 2004) and enhance global efficiency and 
local responsiveness (see Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989, Gluesing and Gibson 2004, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi 1995). Generally speaking, it is assumed that the idea of requisite variety helps 
explain why companies intentionally increase team diversity in response to complex global 
environments.  
 
Research on intercultural teams attempts to understand their specific dynamics and to develop 
managerial recommendations, with many interesting insights having already been produced 
(Milliken and Martins 1996, Elron 1997, Thomas 1999, Randel 2003, Jackson et al. 2003). 
Transfers from other research fields such as sociology, and social and cognitive psychology 
have also contributed to structuring the field. But research is still in its early stages. Many 
questions persist without any clear answers. Scholars are thus exploring other fields which 
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might be helpful in the effort to build robust theoretical foundations. In this context, the LRV 
seems to offer a good framework for intercultural business issues (Lane et al. 2004). 
 
Although the LRV was stated and validated as a law in cybernetics, it is generally used by 
analogy in the field of management. Whether the LRV is really transposable and useful in 
better understanding and managing diversity in teams has, however, rarely been explained or 
questioned in-depth. The aim of this research is to address these questions. The focus is on 
intercultural teams where diversity is a key issue. 
 
We will proceed as follows. In section 1 we question whether the LRV can really be used 
when theorizing about the management of intercultural teams. In section 2 we explain our 
method and the case studied in this research. Section 3 presents the data and its interpretation. 
Discussion and conclusions are developed in section 4. 
 
1. The law of requisite variety: from cybernetics to intercultural teams 
1.1. Law of requisite variety as formulated in the field of cybernetics 
The LRV was first stated by William Ashby in 1956. It can be explained in the following 
words: let D1 and D2 be two systems and V1 and V2 their respective varieties. The word 
variety will be used to designate either (i) the number of distinct elements included in a single 
system, or (ii) the number of possible states (S) it can assume. For instance, the variety of a 
simple electric system that can either assume states “on” or “off” equals 2. The LRV states 
that in order to control a system, its variety (i.e. the states it can assume) must be controlled. 
System D1 can only be fully controlled by system D2 under the condition that the latter’s 
variety (V2) is equal or superior to the former’s variety (V1). In other words, the number of 
distinct states that D2 can enter into must be at least equal to those of the system D1 (D2≥D1) 
(Ashby 1977: 130).  
 
In publications that refer to Ashby’s work, the LRV is very often reduced to the three 
following ideas: 
- Some of the states a system can assume are not desirable, thus it is necessary to control 
systems in order to avoid undesirable states and to elicit those which are desirable (Zeleny 
1986: 269). 
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- Only variety can control, reduce, force down, or absorb variety (Beer 1974: 30, Ashby 
1977: 135, Calori and Sarnin 1993: 87, Choo 1997: 30, Choo 1998: 263). 
- In order to control a system whose variety is V, another system is required whose variety 
must be at least equivalent to V (Ashby 1956, Ashby 1977, Daft and Wiginton 1979, 
Weick 1979:188, Le Moigne 1990, Durand 1998). In other words, in order to control a 
system which can assume V states, another system is required that can assume at least 
each of the same V states, and eventually more. 
 
1.2. From cybernetics to social systems 
In cybernetics, a system is made up of communications between observers who co-participate 
by drawing distinctions and creating relations within the system. This contrasts sharply with 
the use of system in the structural-functional school of sociology, where it denotes a pattern of 
social acts in pursuit of individual and collective goals and is governed by the need of the 
“social system” to maintain its own structure
1
. In more general terms, systems analysis 
defines a system as anything which works towards a finality in an active and evolutionary 
environment. It does so by carrying out an activity, by organizing, and by evolving, all 
without losing its identity (Le Moigne 1990). 
 
The LRV has been widely applied to organization theory to explain how social systems might 
control complex tasks, and how they might control themselves. But “neither Wiener nor 
Ashby were experienced or even interested in dealing with social systems. It is only their later 
interpreters who made the arching leaps which the founders never cared to make” (Zeleny 
1986: 270). Zeleny assumes that, because requisite variety is presented as a law, many 
scholars in the field of management and organization theory confer a universal value on it. He 
criticizes the opportunistic and sometimes abusive use of the LRV. But authors have not 
addressed whether a law from systems, as defined in cybernetics, is relevant for social 
systems as defined in sociology. 
 
Indeed, the very idea of a law in social sciences makes little sense. In the modern conception 
of science, a law designates a general formula stating a correlation between physical 
phenomena, and confirmed by experiment. But social sciences are not concerned with 
                                                 
1
 Web dictionary of Cybernetics and Systems – http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/ASC/SOCIAL_SYSTE.html  
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physical phenomena. By extension, a law designates a sine qua non condition, an essential 
and constant principle. In social sciences such essential, irrefutable conditions do not exist. 
The very idea of constancy does not really make sense as it might in physics and cybernetics. 
Thus, even if the principles of requisite variety could be transferred to the field of social 
sciences, it would be more appropriate to refer to it as a concept rather than a law.  This 
approaches the concept of “fit” in contingency theory (Drazin and Van de Ven 1985). In 
management, requisite variety is used as an analogy rather than a law. 
 
1.3. Organizations and intercultural teams are social systems  
Emerging from systems theory, contingency theory defines organizations as systems which 
have to deal with specific contingencies that shape their structure, technology, and 
environment (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967). An organization is “an identifiable social entity 
pursuing multiple objectives through the coordinated activities and relations among members 
and objects. Such a social system is open-ended [existing in continuous interaction with its 
environment] and dependent for survival on other individuals and sub-systems in the larger 
entity – society” (Hunt 1972:4). Taking this idea further, the idea of national culture in which 
organizations are embedded was developed by Hofstede (1980) into a general theory of 
national culture as a contingency. 
 
Workgroups and teams are organizational sub-entities. Workgroups (1) contain two or more 
members; (2) are intact social systems with clear boundaries, meaning that group members 
perceive themselves as a group and are recognized as such by others; (3) execute one or more 
measurable tasks. They “engage in multiple, interdependent functions, on multiple, concurrent 
projects, while partially nested within, and loosely coupled to, surrounding systems” 
(McGrath 1991:151). Teams are specific workgroups that have a high degree of “groupness” 
or member interdependence (Cohen and Bailey 1997). 
 
Diversity is more frequently evoked in the context of organizations and teams than is variety. 
But whether they are similar concepts is not clearly stated in the literature. On the one hand, 
they generally pertain to “any mixture of items characterized by differences and similarities” 
(Thomas 1996:5). “Heterogeneity”, “variety” and “diversity” are sometimes cited in the 
literature without explicit distinction and they refer equally to differences between individuals 
with respect to characteristics or attributes (Milliken and Martins 1996, Ely and Thomas 2001, 
Jackson et al. 2003). On the other hand, diversity is assumed to include separation, disparity 
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and variety. Variety includes more specifically the “composition of differences in kind, 
source, or category of relevant knowledge or experience among unit members” 
(Harrison and Klein 2007: 1203). In line with the previous authors, the differences 
between diversity and variety will be distinguished in this research. 
 
Intercultural teams are composed of members with different cultural origins. Culture refers to 
socialization within a group and is often reduced to ethnic or national origins (Kirchmeyer 
and Cohen 1992, Watson et al. 1993) with reference being made to the nation in which a 
person has spent the largest and most formative part of her/his life (Hambrick et al. 1998). But 
culture can also refer to socialization in any kind of social group: regional, religious, 
professional, or based on social class, (etc.) as long as these groups “collectively share certain 
norms, values or traditions that are different from those of other groups” (Cox 1993:6). 
Culture is a pattern of deeply rooted values and assumptions concerning societal functioning 
which is shared by an interacting group of people (Adler 2002, Maznevski et al. 2002). Such 
values concern broad preferential tendencies (Hofstede 1980). Cultural values not only affect 
perception, processing, and interpretation of information, they also shape individual 
behaviours (Hambrick et al. 1998). Thus, intercultural teams are assumed to have more 
intrinsic features of diversity than other sorts of teams. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the LRV in the context of intercultural teams.  In order to perform a task, a 
team’s variety must fit its task’s variety. A team’s performance is evaluated within its 
organizational context, and the result of the teamwork will not be considered as satisfying if 
the definition of the task does not meet the organization’s requirements. The organization is 
part of the context where the task takes place and is defined. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Fit between task and team varieties 
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2. Method and presentation of the case study 
This research is based on qualitative data collected and analysed within a single case study. 
The case was selected because of its appropriateness in regard to the research question: an 
intercultural team working together for several years confronted with a complex task. The 
team’s configuration changed several times. Teamwork was fruitful at some moments, while 
results were very poor at others. 
 
2.1. Presentation of the case study  
The case studied in this article is that of an international team, named Global Way team 
(GWt), managing an enterprise resource planning (ERP) project in an industrial multinational 
group. To maintain anonymity the group will be called  Alpha.  
 
A multinational group 
Alpha is a world-wide automotive industry supplier with headquarters in France, employing 
about 3,200 people. It is the leader in the European market and second world-wide. Alpha is 
highly international. It has subsidiaries in 20 countries on 4 continents (Europe, the Americas 
and Asia). The German subsidiary is the group’s largest with over 1,350 employees, while 
about 700 people work in the French factories and offices.  
 
Organizational adaptation to better “fit” the changes in the market environment 
Up to 1995, Alpha had a very polycentric group structure with strong local adaptation. 
Cultural differences among subsidiaries were numerous. Customer relations were nearly 
always handled by local units. Interactions with foreign customers and members from other 
subsidiaries of the group were scarce. But Alpha’s market environment changed during the 
late 1990s. Its customers, automotive companies, became increasingly global. Local handling 
was no longer adapted to customer needs. Greater international coordination of Alpha’s 
activities and subsidiaries became vital. The group structure progressively changed as a result 
of new CEO leadership in 1998. The new CEO strongly believed in the importance of cultural 
diversity and local adaptation. He gradually modified the group structure into a matrix 
organization based on increased cooperation and coordination among subsidiaries.  
 
The development of international teams 
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As a result of the new matrix organization, international teams were set up to develop 
cooperation and coordination between the subsidiaries. Two main categories of international 
teams were developed, the first category being horizontal and functional. All the directors 
from Alpha’s subsidiaries with the same functional activities (e.g. marketing, quality control, 
etc.) met, on average, twice a year. Their degree of cooperation was not very intense: they 
exchanged experiences and opinions concerning their everyday work, discussed common 
problems, tried to homogenize work procedures between the different countries, but they had 
no concrete tasks to accomplish, and no control over performance. After the directors, 
coordinators were expected to encourage meetings and discussions within international teams, 
but they had no formal authority. 
The second category was inter-functional. People from diverse functions and subsidiaries 
worked together on the same customer vehicle project. These teams were set up for short 
periods of time (a number of  weeks), and during this period, teamwork was quite intense. The 
teams experienced extreme pressure to achievement specific goals. Their performance was 
evaluated by the customer.  
The development of international teams substantially increased the number of interactions 
between members of different subsidiaries.  
 
The Global Way team and the ERP project 
The major international team (in terms of number of people concerned and duration of 
teamwork), named Global Way team (GWt), was set up in 2000 to design and implement an 
Enterprise Resource Planning system (ERP) to support global coordination and control of 
group activities. In 2002, more than 50 people were members of the GWt and teamwork 
continued until 2006. In this paper, we will analyse the case of this team in order to question 
the link between its cultural variety and the complexity of its task.  
Despite the fact that by the end of 2006, the team had performed its task, the process and the 
results of the teamwork were not always satisfying. The team was greatly off target compared 
with the initial schedule and budget. Target specifications had to be changed. For a short time 
the ERP bore no relation with the managers’ and end-users’ requirements. Thus, the ERP 
project had a very negative impact on the relationship between the different subsidiaries, as 
well as on the organizational climate. As we will show in section 3, these negative teamwork 
outcomes were strongly linked to the question of variety.  
 
2.2. Research design 
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Data collection 
Thirty half-directive, in-depth interviews were conducted. Seventeen members from the 
French headquarters and subsidiary were interviewed, with nine members being interviewed 
from the German subsidiary and four from the Spanish. When possible, the interviews were 
conducted in the interviewee’s mother language (e.g. French, German or English).    
The aim of the interviews was to collect data on two main themes. The first theme was 
understanding Alpha’s history, organization, strategy and structure. The second concerned 
GWt, its task, history, aims, processes, problems and achievements.  
 
Data analysis 
In this paper, we use a “narrative strategy” (Langley 1999) to report the evolution of the GWt 
and its task. This seems appropriate considering the richness of the collected data. Our aim is 
to question the ‘fit’ between the variety in the GWt and its task varieties at each phase of the 
process, in order to outline conditions under which the LRV can be useful for the study of 
intercultural teams. 
The story of the GWt is told in a step by step manner. At each step of the narration, the 
concept of requisite variety is addressed. We question whether the LRV “fits” the team’s 
experience, how much it helps in understanding team successes and failures, and conversely 
what it does not help to understand. Then, we formulate hypotheses concerning the use of the 
LRV in the context of intercultural teams.  
 
A first step in a long-term research process 
This exploratory research is a first step in a long-term process of knowledge creation. Two 
distinct theoretical backgrounds are combined (e.g. LRV and intercultural teams) and applied 
in the context of a case study. Further research is needed to extend the results that emerge 
from this research. 
 
3. The Global Way team and its task: the story of multiple levels of variety 
In this section, the GWt story is presented in five chronological phases. Some of them 
illustrate easy application of the LRV to intercultural teams; others show that the LRV is not 
sufficient to explain the team performance.  
 
3.1. Phase 1: The balance between the varieties of a team and a task 
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Diversity inheritance... 
Up until the 1980s, Alpha was a very polycentric group that fitted local markets. Strong local 
adaptation resulted in strong cultural differences and great diversity between subsidiaries 
which manifested in the following ways: 
- Subsidiaries were essentially located in different countries, and managers and employees 
were exclusively “locals”, natives from the country.  
- Subsidiaries had different customer portfolios, and customer relations were managed 
locally.  
- Subsidiaries had different product offerings, and products were mainly manufactured 
locally. 
- Subsidiaries had developed different routines and work processes to manage, plan and 
control local activity, and most of the time, work processes had been created and 
improved locally. 
- Subsidiaries used different information systems (IS), and most of the time, IS had been 
designed, developed, implemented and adopted locally to fit local work processes and 
needs. 
Alpha’s polycentric group structure was adapted to their activities as long as their customers, 
the automotive groups, were not highly international. Alpha’s organization enabled the group 
to efficiently address its customers’ diverse requirements. Alpha’s internal diversity fitted the 
market environment diversity. 
 
Changing requirements 
The automotive industry considerably changed during the 1980s and 1990s. It became more 
and more global, and finally, required suppliers to globalize too. Alpha’s organization no 
longer fitted new customer requirements: automotive company suppliers were expected to be 
able to provide identical products in all international markets. Moreover, through local 
handling of the orders of world-wide customers, Alpha’s subsidiaries sometimes acted as if 
they were competitors and not belonging to the same group. Deeper international coordination 
between activities and subsidiaries became vital. 
Almost simultaneously, the French headquarters' IT department was considering the 
eventuality of the “year 2000 bug”. It was also worried whether the local IS, designed and 
implemented during the 1970s, would be adaptable to the Euro. 
 
Time for change and the IS project 
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A new CEO was appointed in 1998. He considered the need for a new IS in France as a good 
way to make a first step towards globalisation, especially in regard to both the group structure 
and the French IS mis-fits. 
Since the French site needed a new IS before 2000, it was decided that a pilot project would 
be conducted in France. This decision was a pragmatic one as the complexity of a global IS 
project was reduced to a smaller project. Popular thought at the time was that this approach 
would help more easily manage both the schedule and project budget. Although the pilot 
project was to take place in France, the overall IS project remained global. The long-term 
vision was that the French pilot project would be progressively rolled-out and simultaneously 
deployed in the nine foreign subsidiaries of the group. 
French IT specialists recommended the introduction of an Enterprise Resource Planning 
(ERP) system. SAP was chosen because it was the only ERP that could integrate every 
language spoken in the Alpha Group, including Japanese. Apart from the language aspect, no 
cultural differences between subsidiaries were taken into consideration in the specifications. 
 
GWt variety 
During Spring 1998, the GWt was formed to undertake the ERP pilot project. Stakeholders 
were: 
- The project leader, an IT specialist with knowledge of IS project management.  
- Several heads of the functional departments concerned with the project who had overall 
knowledge of their departments’ business, strategies, organization, objectives and norms. 
They provided preferences and directives, and tested preliminary versions. 
- End-user experts from every functional department concerned with the project. They 
possessed knowledge of their working processes, functional languages, habits and 
routines. They provided necessary information to implement the ERP and also tested 
preliminary versions. 
- IT specialists who were knowledgeable about ERP technology. They parameterised the 
ERP modules to fit manager and end-user requirements. 
 
All the team members were French and most of them had long working experience in the 
French subsidiary. Thus, the fit between the team’s variety and the ERP pilot project was 
good.  
 
Pilot project initial success 
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The GWt worked nearly full-time on the project. It took them a year and a half to design, 
parameterise and deliver the ERP. The ten SAP modules were deployed simultaneously in the 
French subsidiary during a single week-end in October 1999. The pilot project was delivered 
on time. It fulfilled the initial schedule of conditions. The budget was respected. It was a good 
performance considering that typically, ERP projects experience delays, budgets are not 
respected, and initial requirements are partially abandoned during the process.  
 
Return to the LRV 
In the words of the LRV, this first phase of the process can be summed up in the following 
terms and are represented in figure 2: 
1. In the long run, the task was to set up an ERP for a global group. But the task of the first 
step, was to set up the French IS pilot project. Organizational strategies, objectives, 
requirements, budget, schedule, and IT architecture, language and parameters were 
variables of the task’s variety.  
2. The team was the social system responsible for the project, the design of the deliverables 
and fulfilment of specifications. Differences in expertise, functional areas and hierarchical 
levels between the team members were variables of the team’s internal variety. During the 
French IS pilot project phase, the team’s variety fitted the sub-task’s variety, and the team 
performed well. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Balance between team and task varieties during the French pilot project  
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This pilot project was just a first step towards the development of a group-wide international 
ERP. In the phases that followed, the balance between task and team variety was not 
maintained.  
 
3.2. Phase 2: The broken balance 
Knowledge capitalisation 
At the beginning of 2000, a new subsidiary called Alpha Networks was created to capitalize 
experience, best-practices and feedback from members of the pilot project and its end-users. 
The creation of a legal corporate entity underlined the importance of the project and increased 
GWt independence from the French headquarters. Moreover, Alpha Networks would 
theoretically be able to improve knowledge capitalisation and coordinate the work of the 
GWt. A former IT specialist who participated in the pilot project was appointed head of Alpha 
Networks. Managers and end-user experts who took part in the pilot project had returned to 
their functional activities. Alpha Networks was an IT department peopled with French IT 
specialists. 
 
Project replication 
Alpha Network’s mission was to deploy the French IS in the foreign subsidiaries and as the 
German subsidiary was the largest of these, it was the next implementation site. It was 
decided that the IS implemented in Germany should be at least 80% identical to the French 
version. Thus, the French ERP system was presented to the German executives. It was 
explained that the IS they would be using to manage their operations would be identical to the 
French version, aside from the language. 
 
Outrage 
The French manager of the GWt presented the ERP as an ordinary software program, and a 
virtual organization was presented, based on the French subsidiary model. Nobody in the first 
GWt had ever imagined that the German organization could be completely different from the 
French one. Nobody in France seemed to have anticipated that the ERP project could have a 
very strong effect on the German organization, its management methods, production systems 
and business flows. German executives were outraged. The ERP did not at all fit their local 
organization. Having always been independent and self directing within the corporate context, 
they felt completely misunderstood and frustrated. Discussions turned into open conflict. 
Finally the German executives simply refused to implement the ERP. 
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Return to the LRV 
In the words of the LRV, this second phase of the process introduced significant differences 
as compared to phase 1.  
1. The French pilot project was a sub-task with the global IS project being the task. In phase 
2, the team faced a task with much greater variety. The ERP now had to fit both the 
French and German subsidiaries. The number of forms the task could take increased 
dramatically because of both national and inter-subsidiary cultural differences. The French 
pilot project deliverable (e.g. the ERP system) did not fit the new requirements. 
2. GWt membership had significantly changed. It was essentially composed of IT specialists, 
whereas in phase 1 functional managers and end-user experts were also part of the team. 
Thus, its internal variety was much smaller and its attention focused on technology 
replication, adaptation and deployment, although the variety of the task to be carried out 
had increased. The team’s variety did not fit the task’s variety.  
 
 
Figure 3 - The broken balance between team and task varieties  
 
3.3. Phase 3: New project and new balance 
Frustration and resignation 
At the beginning of 2001, it became clear that the first ERP solution would not fit the foreign 
subsidiaries’ requirements and adaptations would not be satisfactory. A fundamentally 
different ERP solution was needed for the group. GWt members were very frustrated. They 
felt helpless with regard to the problems. They saw no possibility of resolving the crisis and 
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did not want to restart the project. The head of Alpha Networks and half of the eight GWt 
members resigned. 
 
New GWt and new tensions 
A third ERP team was set up with both French and German members. A French engineer, 
who was not an IT specialist, was chosen to lead this new GWt that contained many fewer IT 
specialists. But tensions grew quickly within the team. The German members were not 
satisfied with the French leadership and considered that their points of view and ways of 
working were not adequately taken into consideration. A schism was perceivable within the 
team: 
- From the French point of view, the Germans systematically criticized and undid the work 
that had been accomplished by the first GWt. 
- The Germans felt that the French were unwilling to abandon “their” version of the ERP. 
They considered that the French members of GWt did not sufficiently take into account 
the procedures of the German subsidiary. Moreover, the Germans did not appreciate the 
“French” approach to teamwork as called for by the French team leader. Well-known 
stereotypes were brought up by both of the national subgroups, concerning precision of 
schedules and working hours and participative versus directive leadership styles..  
 
Further changes 
Given both the growing tensions between members of the GWt, and the poor results of the 
team, the leadership was changed yet again. Two project managers were appointed: 
- An American woman who had worked at the French headquarters for several years. She 
became project head representing the “consultancy” side, meaning SAP. 
- A German man who was former director of the German subsidiary IT department. He was 
appointed project head representing the “customer” side, being Alpha’s subsidiaries. He 
considered himself more a “businessman” than a “technician” as he was not an IT 
specialist.  
They started developing a jointly defined system for team work. The GWt was divided into 
sub-teams composed of both German and French members. Each sub-team had as mission to 
find common solutions for specific aspects of the overall ERP project. 
 
Return to the LRV 
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By the end of this third phase of the project, the need for requisite variety was considered for 
the first time. Managers were finally aware of the complexity of the task and of the 
organization. The challenge was larger than simply combining subsidiaries. 
1. The task was recognized as more complex than an ordinary IT project; it was also a 
question of corporate strategy and organizational design. The degree of complexity was all 
the more significant, as the previous phases of the project had significantly damaged 
corporate climate and confidence between the German subsidiary and French 
headquarters.  
2. The need for fit between team and task complexities was finally recognized. Team variety 
was assumed to be achieved thanks to three meta-variables: national diversity, 
“consultancy” (IT) and “end-user” distinction, and management methods.  
 
 
Figure 4 – Lack of performance despite the introduction of cultural variety in the team 
 
3.4. Phase 4: Task and team enlargement 
One more significant change 
Alpha’s CEO, together with the GWt leaders, realized that the task had been underestimated. 
They wanted to avoid repeating the mistakes that had been previously made in the project. 
The final ERP solution had to not only fit the French and German organisations, but the whole 
group as well, with its subsidiaries in ten countries. This dramatically increased the task’s 
variety, but for the first time, the task was no longer reduced to sub-tasks. It was considered in 
its entirety.  
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Yet another “new” GWt  
Thus, the GWt composition changed once again. The French and German project members 
were joined by “function leaders” from the Czech, Italian, Spanish and American subsidiaries. 
Individuals from the Japanese, Chinese and Brazilian subsidiaries were not included for 
geographical and cultural reasons. British members were not included because of the small 
size of the British subsidiary. Each “function leader”, regardless of his nationality, represented 
a specific SAP module, which often corresponded to one department (i.e. quality 
management) and one subsidiary in particular. At its height, 50 people were permanent 
members of the GWt. Work was organized on the basis of a “global template”.  First, the GWt 
was asked to create a consensual virtual organization. Then it would design the future ERP to 
fit this commonly defined virtual organization. 
 
More problems  
Up until October 2001, teamwork had been very difficult. In France, the SAP pilot version 
had already been rolled-out. It was operational and people used it for daily work. For the 
French subsidiary, a new ERP project meant additional future changes in their work 
processes. Above all, it was thus far, impossible to reach a consensual vision of a virtual 
global organization and common working processes. Six month after the GWt had been yet 
again restructured, teamwork progressed very slowly. No agreement was found on any detail 
of the project. Differences between the function leaders’ points of view seemed irreconcilable. 
Difficulties were also due to the differences in size between the French and German 
subsidiaries on the one hand (about 1000 employees each), and the size of the other 
subsidiaries (fewer than 100 employees each). Internal organization, management, and work 
processes were very different. The representatives of the small subsidiaries feared that using 
and administering SAP would immobilise too large a percentage of the workforce as 
compared to the subsidiary’s size. The project was stopped once more. Almost three years 
after the beginning of the GWt, there was still no tangible progress that had been made. 
 
Return to the LRV 
Alpha’s leadership was now completely aware of variety requirements concerning the GWt: 
1. Every subsidiary was now recognized as concerned with the project. The task was finally 
recognized as being highly complex, and its high variety was taken into consideration. 
Previous phases of the project significantly damaged corporate climate and trust between 
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foreign subsidiaries and the French headquarters. Thus, the task complexity was at its 
maximum. 
2. Stakeholders of the GWt were representatives from every functional and hierarchical level 
of the organisation, and six out of the ten subsidiaries participated in the project. Thus, in 
theory, the fit between the varieties of the task and the team should have been good. But 
the team still performed poorly. Its variety was too big for consensus to be reached and 
tasks performed in a reasonable time.  
 
 
Figure 5 - Impossibility to manage an extremely varied team 
 
This phase highlights that, in the field of intercultural team management, though requisite 
variety between task and team varieties might be a necessary condition, it alone is not a 
sufficient condition for performance.  
 
3.5. Phase 5: Reduction of team and task varieties  
One more task redefinition 
At the end of 2001, the project was modified once again and its specifications reduced. The 
team was charged with the design of a common solution for the two “big” subsidiaries of the 
group (e.g. France and Germany). This extensive ERP solution would later be simplified and 
adapted to fit the “small” subsidiaries. 
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One more GWt 
A new, fifth, GWt was set up with half French and half German employees as members. In 
other words, representatives from the Czech, Italian, Spanish and American subsidiaries were 
retired from the project.  
The bi-national team members worked together full-time. They moved from France to 
Germany on a weekly basis (so that everyone could live with his or her family 9 out of 14 
days). The bi-national direction played a linking role between the two cultural groups.  
 
Results at last 
By February 2002, the situation had radically improved. Team member satisfaction was high. 
They had gotten to know each other, had developed common ways of working, and managed 
to design solutions acceptable for both subsidiaries. Several modules of the ERP had already 
been designed. 
At the end of 2002, the new SAP version was implemented in both the French and German 
subsidiaries. A simplified and adapted version was rolled-out in Italy in 2004, in Spain in 
2005, and in the Czech Republic in 2006. The remaining subsidiaries (i.e. Great Britain, USA, 
Brazil, China, and Japan) would follow. 
 
Return to the LRV 
On the one hand, phases 1 and 5 seem to be quite similar. In both phases, the team and task 
varieties fit, and teamwork provided satisfying results. On the other hand, there are significant 
differences: 
- In phase 5, team members and leaders were aware of the “true nature” of the task. They 
knew the difficulty of the task had been purposely reduced, in order to make the task do-
able in a reasonable time, but that in the long run, the ERP had to be deployed to all of the 
subsidiaries. As a consequence, the team tried, whenever possible, to find a solution that 
could be easily adapted to the smaller subsidiaries at a later time. In other words, the team 
attempted to find parsimonious solutions. 
- In phase 1, the GWt had no international variety. But in phase 5, the two main 
nationalities (in terms of number of employees) were equally represented. Even though 
every subsidiary was not represented in phase 5, the GWt managed to design an ERP 
solution that was easy to adapt to every subsidiary of the group. 
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These results highlight that the team and task varieties do not necessarily need to exactly fit 
one another. However, it seems important that every type of required variety be represented in 
the team. The task, here, had a high level of variety because of its international nature; there 
had to be international variety in the team to master it, but not necessarily a very high level. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Performance of the team after reduction of task and team varieties 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to question whether the LRV can be useful in better understanding 
and managing intercultural teams. In several phases of the case study, the main tenants of the 
LRV contribute to explaining the performance of intercultural teams (see table 1): 
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Table 1 – Synthesis of main results 
Phase 
Group Variety / 
task variety  
Team 
perfor-
mance  
LRV explains 
team outcomes 
Intervening processes 
1 French pilot project Fit + + 
The task was 
underestimated, the sub-
task was well performed 
2 
A French project for a 
global group 
Mis-fit - + Task variety was increased 
3 
French leadership of a 
bi-cultural team 
Fit - - 
Leadership was not 
accepted, no commitment 
by foreign team members 
4 
A team including 6 
nationalities 
Fit - - 
Impossible to manage a 
large and very varied team 
5 French-German team Fit + + Reduction of task variety 
 
 
- When team and task varieties fit, the performance of the team was quite good (see phases 
1 and 5). But when team variety was clearly inferior to task variety, performance was very 
poor (see phase 2). This observation is consistent with the LRV. It suggests that if a team 
is composed of enough different people to imagine the variety of “states” its task might 
assume, then, the team should be able to perform the task. 
- When team and task varieties had a poor fit, either team variety was amplified (see phase 
3 and 4) or task variety was attenuated (see phase 5). This observation is consistent with 
previous theoretical propositions suggesting that in case of lack of fit between team and 
task varieties, “there are two general strategies, which may be combined: the first is to 
amplify variety in an organization or a team, and the second is to attenuate variety from 
the task environment” (Choo, 1997: 30; 1998: 263). 
- When there was no international variety within the team (see phase 1), the team was 
unable to understand the complexity of the task and master it. Incorporating international 
variety in the team contributed to amplifying its variety (see phase 3), and rendered it 
capable of imagining the different states the task might take. 
- When team variety became too great, team management was very difficult, and teamwork 
progressed very slowly (phase 4). This result is consistent with previous research on 
intercultural teams; they are known to need more time than other teams to validate ideas, 
participants and procedures, to find a consensus and to set up joint actions (Adler, 2002).  
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The case study shows that the LRV delivers insights concerning the composition of a team 
with regard to the definition of the task it shall perform. More precisely, it stresses that a 
balance – a fit – must be sought between task variety and team variety. On the one hand, if the 
task variety is too high for the team to understand and manage it, the team might fail to 
achieve the task. On the other hand, if the team variety is too high, it can also have counter 
productive effects that might result in failure. 
Requisite variety appears as a condition for performance of the team, in the same way that it 
has been considered as a favourable condition for knowledge creation or sense-making in 
other contexts (Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995, Weick 1995). But the fulfilment of this initial 
condition does not guarantee successful team processes and/or outcomes. 
 
4.1. Considerations concerning variety 
The balance between team and task variety can be difficult to establish and maintain. In 
cybernetics, requisite variety is stated as a mathematical equilibrium between two distinct 
stable and calculable variables. But in social systems such as intercultural teams, variables of 
variety cannot be easily identified or calculated. They can also be very difficult to recognize, 
evaluate and anticipate.  
- Team variety results from the differences in personal characteristics of the team members 
(Milliken and Martins 1996). But some of these characteristics may overlap and interact, 
and a general “measure” of team variety seems difficult to establish.  
- Very few insights can be found in the literature concerning task variety. This knowledge 
gap raises great problems for applying the LRV.  
To increase the transferability of the LRV to social systems and its actionability for 
management, further research is needed either to determine the components of variety in 
social settings (especially the components of task variety), or to set up a method to define 
variety in social settings.  
 
4.2. Considerations concerning fit 
Requisite team variety, considered as the sum of individual varieties, might not be a sufficient 
condition for balance. Discussing the constituents of variety draws the focus to the 
composition of teams. But the performance of a team is greatly determined by dynamic 
aspects like the capacity of the team to interact, to learn and to create knowledge. A team’s 
variety is not quantifiable. Managerial or leadership processes, as well as internal processes 
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linked to motivation, implication and communication might amplify or attenuate the team’s 
variety.  
 
Leadership and the variety of an intercultural team  
In a business context, a team leader has the possibility of letting his team completely express 
its variety, the different points of view and ways of working or, on the contrary, he can 
attenuate its variety. This can be done by imposing routines on the team that do not take into 
account the different cultural preferences, or by not letting certain team members express their 
opinions. This is what happened in the beginning of phase 3 of the GWt, when a French 
engineer managed a bi-cultural team in a context of strong tensions between the French and 
the German “sides”.  
The LRV incompletely explains residual variety of complex systems. “Because social systems 
are organized systems and their ‘components’ are highly interdependent, their variety can be 
reduced by discovering or imposing constraints; also, for the same reasons, by increasing their 
interdependence” (Zeleny, 1986 : 270). More complex control phenomena emerge that guide 
interactions and influence the system’s residual variety.  
The external control exerted on a social system can reduce its variety by forcing it to take only 
some of the states it could theoretically or potentially assume (Zeleny, 1986). In 
organizational contexts, control is exerted by the team manager and the organization’s 
requirements. Non-participative leadership styles do not permit the group to express its 
variety. Intercultural teams can attempt to produce new ideas thanks to cultural variety, but if 
managers impose routines based only on their own cultural preferences, cultural variety is 
likely to be reduced.  
 
Commitment of team members 
Even if the team leader has a participative leadership style, team members can decide not to 
really engage themselves in the teamwork, for reasons including lack of motivation or a 
willingness to make the team fail. This attitude of non-commitment can also be a way of 
opposing the team leader. During the first half of the third phase, these phenomena occurred 
and as a result reduced the GWt’s variety. As a consequence, the variety became insufficient 
for the team to master a complex task.  
Maloney and Zellmer-Bruhn (2006) state that effective global teams need to find a balance 
between self-verification and social integration. Self-verification means that team members 
recognize the deliberate heterogeneity of the team and acknowledge its presence. This implies 
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that team members share their unique perspectives, and without team member commitment to 
the team, this may not happen.  
 
4.3. Managerial implications 
Some helpful insights can already be drawn from the above propositions. The following 
“check list” might provide additional guidance for managers of intercultural teams.   
 
Evaluating task complexity  
This evaluation is of great importance and can sometimes be very difficult. A task can reveal 
itself as being much more complex than was initially perceived. If the complexity of the task 
is underestimated, there is a big risk of creating a team whose variety is too low, and that will 
as a result, perform poorly. If on the other hand the task is too complex, the team variety 
appropriate for performing the task may be so high that the team becomes impossible to 
manage. In this case, it can be helpful to divide the task into sub-tasks, but then the team is 
not confronted by the task in its entirety.  
 
Defining team composition  
Regarding the complexity of the task, the variety of the team should neither be too low nor 
too high. In intercultural environments, one could assume that the team should include 
members from as many cultural origins as countries that are concerned by the task. But in 
many cases, the size and complexity of the team becomes too cumbersome to be managed. If 
all the cultures concerned by the task cannot be represented in the team, at least some cultural 
variety should be maintained.  
 
Managing the team 
Management should be particularly attentive to the expression of the team’s variety. 
Participative leadership styles should be practiced when possible, given the national cultures 
of team members. The team leader might be better accepted by the team members if he/she is 
not seen as representing only one of the cultures composing the group.  
 
4.4. Limits and avenues for future research 
This research has shown that team dynamics and those processes linked to team leadership 
and commitment may harm the balance between a team and its task variety. Group interaction 
theories might be helpful in identifying other such processes and in deepening the 
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understanding of those discussed here.  
 
More case studies would be helpful in order to deepen the understanding of requisite variety 
of a team. Further case studies might examine teams working on different sorts of tasks. Here, 
the main aspect of variety is intercultural; further research projects could focus more strongly 
on other types of variety such as task complexity. But the literature does not permit us to 
specify task variety, and the insights from the case study of the GWt are embedded within the 
specific task and organizational context. Managerial recommendations issuing from this study 
concerning requisite variety would be more precise if the variety of the task and the variety of 
the team could be measured with greater accuracy. By analogy with risk analysis, where risk 
typologies and cartographies help in risk evaluation and management, a method for the 
evaluation of task variety variables are likely to be helpful in evaluating team and workgroup 
requisite variety and will assist in more effectively fitting the team to the task.  
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